President Donald Trump is considering a dramatic military option that could involve deploying elite troops inside Iran to seize the country’s near-bomb-grade uranium stockpile. The possibility of a special forces mission has emerged as US officials grow increasingly concerned that the highly enriched nuclear material may have been moved from known facilities following last year’s conflict.
The discussion about whether Trump considers special forces to seize Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium comes as military planners attempt to determine the exact location of the nuclear stockpile. According to several diplomatic officials briefed on the matter, uncertainty surrounding the uranium has intensified because international inspectors have not verified its location for nearly nine months.
The United States and Israel targeted several Iranian nuclear facilities during the brief but intense 12-day war last June. While those strikes were intended to cripple Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they also disrupted the monitoring systems that had previously allowed international inspectors to track nuclear materials closely.
As a result, officials now face the possibility that a large quantity of uranium enriched close to weapons grade may no longer be stored where it was previously documented.
The debate over whether Trump considers special forces to seize Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium is rooted in growing uncertainty about the whereabouts of the material.
Before the conflict, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency maintained regular oversight of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Vienna-based agency conducted inspections frequently, sometimes more than once per day, making Iran’s nuclear program one of the most heavily monitored in the world.
That level of oversight collapsed after military strikes damaged major enrichment facilities, including those at Fordow and Natanz. The conflict also affected Iran’s uranium processing center in Isfahan.
According to diplomats familiar with the agency’s assessments, satellite imagery and other monitoring tools detected unusual activity near tunnels built into a hillside close to the Isfahan complex shortly before the latest round of strikes.
That activity has raised the possibility that at least some of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium was moved to an unknown location.
Officials estimate the material in question totals about 441 kilograms of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels. If refined further, that amount could theoretically produce roughly a dozen nuclear warheads.
US officials have often cited a more precise estimate, suggesting the stockpile could be sufficient for approximately 11 nuclear weapons if processed further.
In addition to that material, Iran is believed to possess more than 8,000 kilograms of uranium enriched to lower levels, which could potentially be upgraded if enrichment capabilities are restored.
The growing uncertainty has triggered serious discussions within Washington about potential contingency plans. Among them is the possibility that Trump considers special forces to seize Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium if intelligence agencies can confirm its location.
One diplomatic official said the United States and Israel are actively searching for the material and reviewing military options that could secure it.
Such operations would likely involve elite military units trained for high-risk missions, including rapid entry into hostile territory and the secure extraction of sensitive materials.
However, it remains unclear whether any such mission would be carried out by US forces, Israeli forces, or a joint operation involving both.
Trump himself has acknowledged that the option exists but suggested it is not currently under immediate consideration.
Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One, the president said US forces had not yet attempted to retrieve the uranium.
He explained that American forces have not “gone after it” so far but indicated that the option could be considered in the future if necessary.
At the same time, Trump emphasized that deploying ground forces would require a compelling justification.
According to the president, such an operation would only be undertaken if Iran’s military capabilities were so weakened that its forces would be unable to mount effective resistance on the ground.
Even if the uranium is located, officials say several approaches could be used to ensure it cannot be used for weapons.
A senior administration official previously outlined two main options.
If US forces gained physical control of the territory where the material is stored, specialists could be deployed to dilute the uranium on site, rendering it unsuitable for nuclear weapons.
Another possibility would involve physically removing the uranium from Iran and transporting it to another country where it could be safely handled or dismantled.
Either option would require a highly complex military operation supported by specialized nuclear experts capable of handling radioactive material.
Such missions are considered extremely sensitive because they involve both military and nuclear safety considerations.
The idea that Trump considers special forces to seize Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium is not entirely unprecedented. The US military has previously developed plans for potential operations inside Iran.
One such plan, known as Project Honey Badger, was created decades ago following the 1979 hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran.
That proposal envisioned a massive special operations mission involving roughly 2,400 troops transported by more than 100 aircraft into Iranian territory.
The plan included the deployment of heavy equipment such as bulldozers and excavation machinery. Such equipment would be necessary if troops needed to dig up nuclear materials stored underground.
Although Project Honey Badger was never executed, it illustrates the type of logistical planning required for operations aimed at recovering sensitive materials from heavily fortified locations.
Modern missions would likely be smaller and more technologically advanced but could still require extensive preparation.
Iran signals willingness to protect its nuclear stockpile
Iranian officials have repeatedly suggested they would take extraordinary measures to safeguard nuclear materials during wartime conditions.
Reza Najafi warned earlier that international inspection standards could not be maintained during active military conflict.
He indicated that the agency should not expect normal safeguard procedures to continue under wartime circumstances.
Before the latest escalation, Tehran had signaled it might be open to reducing its stockpile of highly enriched uranium or exporting some of it as part of a diplomatic agreement.
Those negotiations effectively collapsed once the conflict intensified.
Without diplomatic progress, the possibility that Trump considers special forces to seize Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium has become a more prominent topic within security discussions.
Despite concerns about the stockpile, most analysts believe Iran has not yet decided to build nuclear weapons.
US intelligence agencies and international inspectors have not identified a structured program designed to assemble nuclear warheads.
According to the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, the probability that Iran will ultimately decide to build nuclear weapons remains below 50 percent.
However, the existence of highly enriched uranium outside of monitored facilities still represents a serious proliferation risk.
If stored in smaller containers, the material could potentially be transported or concealed for long periods.
Regulatory estimates suggest the uranium could fit into roughly 16 cylinders, each about the size of a large scuba tank.
Each cylinder would weigh around 25 kilograms, making it light enough to be moved by vehicle or even carried by individuals.
The death of former supreme leader Ali Khamenei during the opening phase of the war has also complicated the political landscape surrounding Iran’s nuclear policy.
Khamenei had issued a religious decree, known as a fatwa, prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons.
However, a new leader could potentially reinterpret or abandon that position.
The leadership transition has therefore introduced new uncertainty about the long-term direction of Iran’s nuclear strategy.
Despite the rising military tensions, some governments believe diplomacy could still resolve the dispute.
Iran, along with China and Russia, has suggested that a sustainable diplomatic solution remains possible.
Those comments were delivered during discussions connected to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
However, recent remarks from Trump indicate that the administration is willing to pursue military options if diplomatic efforts fail.
As uncertainty continues about the location of Iran’s nuclear material, the debate over whether Trump considers special forces to seize Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium is likely to remain a critical issue shaping the next phase of the conflict and the global effort to prevent nuclear proliferation.
