Xi Jinping’s resistance to cash handouts faces new test in the age of AI

China’s cautious welfare policy collides with economic slowdown, demographic pressure and the looming impact of artificial intelligence.

Xi Jinping reviews a report as Li Qiang speaks at the National People’s Congress in Beijing.
Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews a work report as Premier Li Qiang delivers his speech during the opening session of the National People’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, on March 5, 2026. Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

For years, Xi Jinping’s resistance to cash handouts has shaped the way China responds to economic crises. While many governments around the world moved quickly to send direct payments to households during difficult times, Beijing has consistently avoided putting money straight into citizens’ bank accounts.

That approach reflected both economic caution and political philosophy. Yet as China’s economy slows and artificial intelligence threatens to reshape global labor markets, Xi’s reluctance to expand welfare payments may soon face its toughest test.

The debate is unfolding at a time of growing uncertainty in the global economy. Wars, technological disruption and shifting trade patterns are forcing governments to reconsider how they protect workers and maintain social stability. In China, those questions carry particular weight for the leadership of the ruling Communist Party of China.

For Xi, maintaining control and long-term stability has always taken precedence over bold fiscal experimentation.

Xi Jinping’s resistance to cash handouts was made clear years before the latest economic challenges emerged. During a meeting with senior economic policymakers in December 2021, Xi criticized governments that relied heavily on welfare programs to support their citizens.

According to official remarks, he warned against what he described as excessive welfare spending that could encourage dependency.

Countries that “embraced populism and pampered a large number of lazy people,” he argued, risked creating long-term economic and political problems.

In Xi’s view, state resources should be used carefully and strategically, rather than distributed widely through unconditional payments.

That philosophy stood in sharp contrast to the policies adopted in countries such as the United States during the pandemic. Governments there issued massive stimulus packages that included direct checks to millions of households in an effort to keep economies afloat.

China’s response was far more restrained.

According to international comparisons, Beijing’s pandemic-era fiscal stimulus amounted to roughly 4.8 percent of gross domestic product. That figure was far smaller than the roughly 25 percent stimulus deployed in the United States and lower than many other major economies.

The difference reflected a broader pattern. China’s spending on social services as a share of GDP remains well below that of many advanced economies.

While China supports an enormous population through various programs, benefits often remain limited.

Rural pensions, for example, can amount to only a few dollars per day. Healthcare coverage exists but often requires families to cover significant costs themselves.

Direct cash assistance is typically reserved for the poorest households rather than the broader population.

A research paper published last year found that about 40 million Chinese citizens received direct cash assistance in 2022 — only about three percent of the country’s population.

That limited approach highlights the depth of Xi Jinping’s resistance to cash handouts.

At the heart of the issue lies a political calculation. Managing the world’s second-largest economy and a population of roughly 1.4 billion people requires constant attention to stability.

Xi’s government fears that large welfare commitments could eventually prove unsustainable. If the state promised benefits it could not deliver in the future, public dissatisfaction could grow quickly.

China also faces mounting demographic pressures. The country’s population is aging rapidly, which will increase pension and healthcare costs in the coming decades.

Those trends make policymakers cautious about creating new obligations.

In addition, China’s economic model is undergoing a difficult transition.

For decades the country relied heavily on property development and infrastructure investment to drive growth. But the real estate sector has struggled since the pandemic, leaving developers heavily indebted and home prices declining.

At the same time, China has become increasingly dependent on exports and manufacturing.

Xi’s government has responded by emphasizing technological development and industrial policy, especially in areas such as artificial intelligence.

Premier Li Qiang recently highlighted this priority during the annual budget presentation, promising to expand the country’s “AI Plus Initiative.” The program aims to accelerate the commercial adoption of artificial intelligence across industries.

China already produces enormous amounts of electricity — nearly twice as much as the United States — helping power the data centers required to train advanced AI systems.

Chinese companies are also moving quickly to apply AI in manufacturing, robotics and autonomous vehicles.

Those innovations could help offset China’s shrinking labor force.

Factories increasingly rely on automation to maintain productivity, while robotics companies are developing humanoid machines that could assist in elder care, delivery services and urban maintenance.

The head of a humanoid robot developed by Honor Device Co. is displayed during a demonstration in Barcelona.
The head of a humanoid robot developed by Honor Device Co. is displayed during a demonstration ahead of MWC Barcelona 2026 in Barcelona, Spain, on March 1, 2026. Photo by Angel Garcia/Bloomberg/Getty Images

In theory, such technologies could help China continue producing goods efficiently even as the workforce declines.

But the rise of automation also introduces a new economic challenge.

Machines do not pay taxes, buy homes or spend money in restaurants.

If robots replace large numbers of workers, consumer spending could weaken further in an economy already struggling with deflationary pressures.

China’s manufacturing sector illustrates the imbalance.

The country produces roughly one-third of all goods manufactured worldwide — more than the combined output of the United States, Germany, Japan and South Korea.

Yet profit margins remain relatively thin, averaging only around 4.5 percent last year.

That flood of production has pushed prices downward, contributing to deflation.

Economic growth measured in real terms has recently outpaced nominal growth, which matters because government tax revenues depend on the latter.

As a result, fiscal pressures are increasing.

International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund have urged Beijing to boost social spending in order to stimulate domestic consumption.

Economists say policies such as improved healthcare, better education funding and expanded welfare benefits could encourage households to spend more rather than save for emergencies.

But Beijing has moved cautiously.

Officials have introduced subsidies for consumer goods like televisions and washing machines rather than distributing direct cash.

Some policymakers argue that many households would simply save cash payments rather than spend them.

Others say the government prefers directing spending toward specific sectors instead of giving individuals complete control over the money.

China’s hesitation also reflects deep historical roots.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, revolutionary leader Mao Zedong created a system known as the “iron rice bowl.”

Under this model, workers in state-owned enterprises received cradle-to-grave benefits including housing, healthcare and pensions.

The system provided security but also reduced incentives for productivity.

Moreover, the government could not afford to provide those benefits to the entire population.

Rural communities were largely excluded, and strict residency rules limited migration from countryside to cities.

After Mao’s death, reformist leader Deng Xiaoping began dismantling the system as part of broader market reforms.

State-owned enterprises shed millions of workers during the 1990s.

The experience left a lasting psychological impact on many Chinese families, who realized they could no longer rely entirely on the state for support.

Savings rates surged as households began preparing for uncertain futures.

Over time, property ownership became a key financial safety net.

Real estate accounted for roughly 70 percent of household wealth in China — far higher than in many Western countries.

For years rising property prices reinforced that strategy.

However, the market downturn following the pandemic has shaken confidence.

Housing values have dropped significantly, leaving many families feeling poorer and more cautious about spending.

Local governments have also suffered financially because they relied heavily on land sales to developers for revenue.

With that income declining, some municipalities have cut salaries or benefits for public employees.

Meanwhile social tensions are gradually increasing.

The organization Freedom House reported that documented protest activity in China rose sharply in 2025 compared with the previous year.

Many demonstrations involved workers demanding unpaid wages.

Despite these pressures, the central government continues to prioritize stability.

China spends heavily on internal security and policing, ensuring that local disturbances rarely spread nationwide.

Yet analysts warn that widespread job losses caused by artificial intelligence could pose a far more serious challenge.

Recognizing the potential risks, Chinese authorities have begun studying AI’s impact on employment.

Earlier this year officials said they were drafting policy guidelines aimed at addressing possible labor disruptions.

Premier Li Qiang acknowledged that employment pressure linked to new technologies may be unavoidable.

He promised the government would introduce measures to support entrepreneurship and job creation as artificial intelligence spreads across the economy.

Among younger Chinese citizens, economic uncertainty is already influencing attitudes toward work.

Some have embraced the concept of “lying flat,” a term used online to describe opting out of intense career competition in favor of a simpler lifestyle.

Others view government employment as the safest option.

Applications for civil service exams have surged over the past decade as job seekers search for stability.

The trend reflects a growing desire for something resembling the old “iron rice bowl.”

Xi Jinping’s resistance to cash handouts may therefore become harder to maintain in the coming years.

If technological change leads to mass layoffs or persistent economic stagnation, pressure could mount for stronger social safety nets.

Expanding welfare programs would represent a major shift for China’s economic model.

But it may eventually become necessary if Beijing wants to maintain social stability and encourage domestic consumption.

For now, Xi appears committed to gradual adjustments rather than sweeping reforms.

Yet history shows that China’s leaders sometimes change course only after economic pressures become impossible to ignore.

As artificial intelligence transforms industries around the world, the debate over welfare policy in China is likely to intensify.

Whether Xi continues resisting cash payments or embraces a more generous safety net could shape not only China’s economic future but also the global balance between technology, labor and social stability.

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